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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward**
There were minimal legislative changes during the survey period from
June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009, but several interesting decisions were
issued by the Georgia Court of Appeals.' Among those were cases
affirming the exclusive remedy doctrine, a case providing insight on the
applicability of statutory employment when the general contractor is an
owner in possession of the property, and several statute of limitations
cases.
I.

LEGISLATION

There were no legislative changes of major significance during the
survey period with the exception of refinements in the legislative
package prepared by the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation
(Board) under the leadership of Judge Carolyn Hall, the chair of the
Board.2
Addressing the notice provisions for workers' compensation awards,
sections 34-9-102(f) 3 and 34-9-1034 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) were modified to require that notice of an award
be sent to the "counsel of record" to satisfy the service requirement for

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eck] & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (BA., summa cum laude, 2002; J.D., cum laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia workers' compensation law during the prior survey period,
see H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & Katherine D. Dixon, Workers' Compensation,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 433 (2008).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 330, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 118.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 118 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(f) (2008
& Supp. 2009)).
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 2, 2009 Ga. Laws at 119 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103 (2008
& Supp. 2009)).
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"issuance" of6 notice of the award so that the twenty-day appeal period
commences.
The collection of medical records is a fundamental part of all workers'
compensation litigation and can be a contentious matter in some
instances. To end the recent debate over whether O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2076
applies to records generated before an on-the-job injury, the statute was
modified to clarify that the "waiver shall apply to the employee's medical
history with respect to any condition or complaint reasonably related to
the condition for which such employee claims compensation. 7 The code
section was also modified to make it clear that the waiver applies
whether or not a hearing has been requested8 and that the Board will be
the final arbiter of compliance or non-compliance. 9
Section 34-9-121 of the O.C.G.A.' ° was amended so that employers in
the construction industry will comply with mandatory requirements for
workers' compensation insurance when insurance coverage is issued
under the laws of another state to employers engaged in the construction
industry in Georgia, so long as the state of issuance reciprocates."
Section 34-9-223 of the O.C.G.A. 12 allows payment of a lump sum to a
trustee appointed by a superior court in expedient situations, 13 such as
those involving minors or the mentally incompetent, and the code section
was modified to make clear that this procedure also applies to settlements. 14
II. APPEALS
In Holder v. City of Atlanta, 5 the employee challenged an order of the
superior court denying his demand for judgment on an agreement,
approved by the Board, that settled his compensation claim. On
January 25, 2007, the Board approved an agreement settling the
claimant's workers' compensation claims based on injuries sustained
while employed by the City of Atlanta. The city challenged this

5.
102(f);
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 1-2, 2009 Ga. Laws at 118-19 (codified at O.C.GA. § 34-9O.C.GA § 34-9-103(a)).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 121 (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-207(a)).
Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-207(b)).
Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-207(c)).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-121 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 3, 2009 Ga. Laws at 120 (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-121(b)).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-223 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 330, § 5, 2009 Ga. Laws at 121 (codified at O.C.GA. § 34-9-223).
294 Ga. App. 568, 669 S.E.2d 504 (2008).
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agreement in the superior court, arguing that a nearly identical
agreement was entered two days prior.1"
On May 25, 2007, the superior court held a hearing on the issue but
did not enter an order remanding the case to the Board to resolve factual
disputes until June 25, 2007, some thirty-one days later. Finally, on
December 21, 2007, the claimant filed in the superior court a "Corrected
Demand for Judgment" asking the court to enforce his January 25, 2007
agreement. The superior court denied his demand, citing its earlier
order remanding the case to the Board."
On appeal, the employee contended that the superior court lacked
jurisdiction to remand the case to the Board because the Board failed to
comply with the statutory time frame established under O.C.G.A. § 34-9105(b),"8 and the court of appeals agreed. 9 Under O.C.G.A. § 34-9105(b), the superior court must hear an appeal from a decision by the
Board within sixty days from the date of docketing." ° If the superior
court fails to hear the appeal within sixty days, the Board's decision
"shall be considered affirmed by operation of law." 1 Similarly, even if
the appeal is heard within sixty days, the superior court's failure to
enter judgment within twenty days of the date of hearing renders the
Board's decision affirmed by operation by law.22
In Holder the employee did not challenge the time frame in which the
superior court heard the case but, rather, challenged the court's failure
to enter judgment within twenty days.2 3 Georgia courts have repeatedly
held that under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) "'the legislature conferred a
limited jurisdiction on the superior courts to review the decisions of the
24
... Board.'"
Under these interpretations, a failure to comply with the
statutory terms removes jurisdiction from the superior court.' In Holder
the superior court entered the order thirty-one days after the hearing

16. Id. at 568-69, 669 S.E.2d at 504.
17. Id. at 569, 669 S.E.2d at 505.
18. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (2008).
19. Holder, 294 Ga. App. at 569-70, 669 S.E.2d at 505.
20. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 294 Ga. App. at 569, 669 S.E.2d at 505.
24. E.g., id. at 570, 669 S.E.2d at 505 (alteration in original) (quoting Pine Timber
Trucking Co. v. Teal, 230 Ga. App. 362, 362, 496 S.E.2d 270, 271 (.998)); see also
Cartwright v. Midtown Hosp., 243 Ga. App. 828, 829, 534 S.E.2d 504, 506 (2000) (holding
that "[the right to judicial review is restricted to the method prescribed by the Workers'
Compensation Act" and is jurisdictional); Brassfield & Gorrie v. Ogletree, 241 Ga. App. 56,
56-57, 526 S.E.2d 103, 104 (1999) (holding that the twenty-day time window promotes the
speedy resolution of workers' compensation cases and is jurisdictional).
25. See cases cited supra note 24.
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and, thus, failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b). 26 "Accordingly,
the decision of the Board approving the settlement agreement 'was
affirmed by operation of law on the twenty-first day after the hearing,
and the superior court lost jurisdiction to enter any order.'"27 As such,
the superior court's denial of the claimant's "Corrected Demand for
Judgment" was reversed.28
III. BURDEN OF PROOF
In Parham v. Swift Transportation Co.,' a claimant suffered renal
failure, and both his employer and his group health insurer rejected his
claim. The employer contended that the renal failure was not jobrelated, but his group health insurer claimed that the injury sustained
was indeed related to the employment.3 °
The administrative law judge (AIJ) found that the employer was
liable under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).3 1 While the
appellate division of the Board affirmed the award, the superior court
reversed and held that the claimant failed to meet his burden of showing
that the renal failure arose from his employment.32 The burden is on the
to show that a sustained injury is compensable under the
employee
33
WCA.

The claimant testified that he was unloading a trailer for approximately ten hours in humid ninety-degree weather. Roughly around
midday, the claimant stated that he felt the heat was beginning to affect
him physically; he wanted to drink a lot of water and felt very weak.
Around 5:30 a.m., he finally reached the point when he felt he needed
medical assistance, so he alerted his supervisor and was directed to go
to Greenville Memorial Hospital. 4
The medical records revealed that the claimant was weak and fatigued
with a fever of 102 degrees. His urinalysis revealed a likely urinary
tract infection (UTI) and acute renal failure. The medical records noted
that he reported he had been working in hot and humid weather for the
past two days and had become fatigued. A renal ultrasound showed
26. 294 Ga. App. at 569-70, 669 S.E.2d at 505.
27. Id. at 570, 669 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Pine Timber, 230 Ga. App. at 363,496 S.E.2d
at 271).
28. Id.
29. 292 Ga. App. 53, 663 S.E.2d 769 (2008).
30. Id. at 54-55, 663 S.E.2d at 771.
31. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2008 & Supp. 2009).
32. 292 Ga. App. at 55, 663 S.E.2d at 771.
33. Id. at 53, 663 S.E.2d at 770 (citing Berry Coll., Inc. v. Storey, 199 Ga. App. 298,
299, 404 S.E.2d 640, 642 (1991)).
34. Id. at 54, 663 S.E.2d at 770-71.
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nothing unusual, and during a three-day stay at the hospital, his renal
failure resolved. The discharging physician noted that no definitive
cause of the UTI or renal failure could be found.3 5 The physician noted,
"It is possible that the patient had some renal failure secondary to his
extreme labor in the hot weather," and the claimant was released from
the hospital.3 6
After the claimant testified, the ALJ found him very credible, and
thus, the ALJ awarded the claimant workers' compensation benefits. 7
The superior court, on the other hand, relied on Globe Indemnity Co. v.
Simonton's and concluded that the claimant failed to show that his
injury was caused by work conditions and activities.39
The court of appeals held that the instant case was distinguishable
from Globe because "the claimant presented evidence regarding his level
of exertion at the time he fell ill" and testified that "the exertion caused
his hospitalization."4 ° The court held that the evidence supported the
AU,'s findings.41 The court also noted that the claimant never experienced renal failure in the past, that his renal failure subsided after a
three-day stay in the hospital, and that nothing in the medical records
indicated his renal failure was the result of anything else.4 2
Relying on the well-established "any evidence" rule,43 the court of
appeals held, "As the trier of fact, the ALJ was free to determine what
portions of the evidence he would consider, what weight such evidence44
would be given, and the credibility of any witnesses or testimony."
Thus, the superior court's judgment was reversed.4 5

35. Id. at 55, 663 S.E.2d at 771.
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. 88 Ga. App. 694, 76 S.E.2d 837 (1953). In Globe Indemnity, the claimant suffered
a stroke, was hospitalized, and became incompetent. Id. at 694, 76 S.E.2d at 837. The
claimant failed to produce evidence as to whether he was exerting himself and whether the
exertion caused his hospitalization. See id. at 696, 76 S.E.2d at 838. The claimant's case
was remanded for the Board to consider additional evidence on "whether the seizure was
brought about by a particular hazard of the claimant's employment." Id.
39. Parham,292 Ga. App. at 55-56, 663 S.E.2d at 771.
40. Id. at 56, 663 S.E.2d at 772.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. E.g., Metro Interiors, Inc. v. Cox, 218 Ga. App. 396,398,461 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1995)
(citing Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Hadley, 174 Ga. App. 503, 505, 330 S.E.2d 432, 434
(1985)).
44. Parham,292 Ga. App. at 56, 663 S.E.2d at 772 (citing Metro Interiors,218 Ga. App.
at 398, 461 S.E.2d at 572).
45. Id.
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IV. COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

In Harrisv. Peach County Board of Commissioners," Wendy Harris,
a Peach County courthouse custodian, dislocated her knee while bending
over to pick up a pill from the floor. The pill belonged to her and had
fallen out of her pocket.4" Harris was awarded workers' compensation
benefits for her injury by the Board based upon its finding that bending
over to retrieve a foreign object from the floor was among the "peculiar
duties of [her] job as a custodian," 8 and consequently "that Harris's
injury arose out of and in the course of her employment."49 The award
was reversed by the superior court on the ground that Harris's injury did
not arise in any part from her employment but instead was a result of
her obesity.'
The court of appeals reversed the superior court's
decision, holding that the claim was compensable under the WCA.5
The court of appeals acknowledged the mandatory deference required
on appeal to any findings made by the Board that are supported by any
evidence, and the court reinstated the Board's finding that Harris was
performing her job duty as a custodian at the time of her injury. 2 The
court held that it was her duty to clean and remove debris from the
floor.' Thus, the court concluded that when Harris's pill fell from her
pocket, it was her duty to remove the pill from the floor, just as it would
have been had it fallen from someone else's pocket.5 4 Therefore, any
injury resulting from removing the pill was an injury arising in the
course of employment.5 5 The fact that Harris's obesity contributed to
the injury did not change the fact that Harris was performing her job
duties when bending over to pick up the pill.' Additionally, the fact
that the pill belonged to Harris and that she may have planned to take
the pill after picking it up did not produce a different result. 7 Based
on the evidence construed in Harris's favor, the court of appeals held

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

296 Ga. App. 225, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009).
Id. at 226, 674 S.E.2d at 38.
Id., 674 S.E.2d at 39 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225, 674 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 228-29, 674 S.E.2d at 40.
Id.
Id. at 228, 674 S.E.2d at 40.
Id. at 231, 674 S.E.2d at 42.
Id. at 229, 674 S.E.2d at 40-41.
Id. at 230, 674 S.E.2d at 41.
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that Harris's knee dislocation arose out of her employment, and the
court reversed the superior court's decision.'
V. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DOCTRINE
5 9 Fannie Parker sued her former employIn Coca-Cola Co. v. Parker,
er, The Coca-Cola Company, along with her former supervisor, alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Parker initially injured her
back, neck, and knee in July 1997 when she was hit by a pallet of
cardboard while it was being moved by a forklift. Parker's physician
restricted her from certain physical activities, and in 1998, when a new
supervisor took over, that supervisor was advised of the restrictions.'
"Following this physical injury, Parker suffered a psychic injury, also in
the course of her employment and related to her physical injury, when
[the supervisor] requested that she perform duties that exceeded those
restrictions."61
On appeal from a denial of Coca-Cola's motion for summary judgment,
Coca-Cola argued that Parker's claim was barred by the exclusive
remedy doctrine of the WCA,62 and the court of appeals agreed.'
When "'an employee suffers a physical injury in the course of employment[,] ... a related claim for mental damages will be barred by the
[Workers' Compensation] Act's exclusive remedy provision."'64 The
court held that "Parker's 'claim for mental damages [was] ancillary to a
physical occurrence arising in the course of employment.'"'
Consequently, because her mental injuries were ancillary to her physical
injuries, Parker's tort claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of
the WCA. 66

58. Id. at 231, 674 S.E.2d at 42.
59. 297 Ga. App. 481, 677 S.E.2d 361 (2009).
60. Id. at 481-82, 677 S.E.2d at 362.
61. Id. at 483, 677 S.E.2d at 363.
62. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (2008). This section states in pertinent part: "The rights and
the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of such employee.., at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss
of service, or death .

. . ."

Id.

63. Parker,297 Ga. App. at 483, 677 S.E.2d at 363.
64. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lewis v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 267 Ga. App.
288, 290, 599 S.E.2d 267, 269 (2004)).
65.

Id. (quoting Lewis, 267 Ga. App. at 292,599 S.E.2d at 270); see also DeKalb County

Bd. of Educ. v. Singleton, 294 Ga. App. 96, 99-100, 668 S.E.2d 767, 769-70 (2008) (holding
that a "psychological injury is compensable only 'if it arises naturally and unavoidably from

some discernable physical occurrence'") (quoting Southwire Co. v. George, 266 Ga. 739, 741,
470 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1996)).
66. Parker,297 Ga. App. at 483, 677 S.E.2d at 363.
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In Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. Butts 6 ' Rheem, the employer, had an
on-site medical facility staffed by doctors and other personnel to provide
medical care to its employees. Mr. Butts was a Rheem employee, and he
had used the facility several times for knee pain, which he had
attributed to standing all day on the job. Eventually, the facility
referred the employee to an orthopedist, who discovered that the problem
was cancer.6

Mr. Butts brought an action in tort alleging that Rheem's on-site
physicians negligently delayed the diagnosis and treatment of his cancer.
The only issue before the trial court on summary judgment was whether
the claims against Rheem were barred by the exclusive remedy
provision. 9 Tort immunity depends upon the compensability of an
injury under the WCA.7 ° The negligence of delaying medical treatment
that exacerbates a prior compensable injury is an accident covered by
the WCA.71
Rheem argued that the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment because working conditions caused the swelling and pain.
Mrs. Butts asserted that the injury did not arise during the course of her
husband's employment but rather stemmed from the doctor's negligence,
which she asserted had nothing to do with his employment.7 2 The trial
court denied Rheem's motion for summary judgment.73
The court of appeals disagreed with the way the issues had been
framed by both parties and focused upon the fact that the "injury
causing accident" was the alleged negligence of Butts's co-employees, the
Rheem physicians.74 The injury arose in the course of employment
because it occurred during work hours at Rheem's medical facility and
because seeking treatment for pain on the job was incidental to Mr.
Butts's work duties.75 The injury also arose out of his employment
because visits to on-site clinics and failures to properly diagnose

67. 292 Ga. App. 523, 664 S.E.2d 878 (2008). Ernesto Butts brought the initial claim,
and his wife was substituted as the plaintiff after his death. Id. at 523-24, 664 S.E.2d at

879.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 524, 664 S.E.2d at 879-80.
70. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 880 (citing Potts v. UAP-GA. AG. Chem., Inc., 270 Ga. 14, 15,506
S.E.2d 101, 102 (1998)).

71. Id. at 525, 664 S.E.2d at 880-81 (citing Crisp RegI Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver, 275 Ga.
App. 578, 580, 621 S.E.2d 554, 557 (2005)).

72. Id. at 525-26, 664 S.E.2d at 881.
73. Id. at 524, 664 S.E.2d at 880.
74.

Id. at 526, 664 S.E.2d at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted).

75. Id.
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conditions are causally connected, regardless of the origin of the
condition.' 6
Because of this causal connection, Rheem alleged that the injurycausing accident arose from the negligence of the physician co-employee,
in which case the injury was compensable under the WCA. 7 Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the superior court's ruling that
Rheem was not protected by tort immunity under the exclusive remedy
provision.78
In Freeman v. Brandau,79 the court of appeals addressed whether the
exclusive remedy doctrine of the WCA was applicable to a county
sheriff.' On March 11, 2005, Julie Ann Brandau, a court reporter, was
shot and killed in a Fulton County courtroom by an inmate who had
escaped custody. The executor of her estate brought an action against
Fulton County Sheriff Myron Freeman and eight other sheriff department employees, alleging that their negligence led to Brandau's
shooting.8'
The exclusive remedy provision of the WCA provides that "no
employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any
2
third-party tort-feasor, other than an employee of the same employer."1
The court noted that under this provision of the WCA, the plaintiff's suit
would be barred "if Freeman and Brandau were both Fulton County
employees at the time of her death."'
Freeman argued that under Freeman v. Barnes," he was a Fulton
County employee for workers' compensation purposes." In Brandau
the court of appeals "affirmed the trial court's conclusions that Fulton
County Superior Court Judge Rowland Barnes was not a Fulton County
employee and that Freeman was not a state employee for workers'
compensation purposes." 6
Further, "[t]hroughout that opinion,

76. Id.
77. Id. at 527, 664 S.E.2d at 881.
78. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 882.
79. 292 Ga. App. 300, 664 S.E.2d 299 (2008). The plaintiffs claimed that Brandau was
working as an independent contractor and not as a Fulton County employee at the time
of her death. Id. at 303, 664 S.E.2d at 302. The court did not address this issue because
it concluded that Freeman was not a Fulton County employee. Id.
80. See id. at 300, 664 S.E.2d at 300.
81. Id.
82. O.C.G.A § 34-9-11(a).
83. Brandau, 292 Ga. App. at 301, 664 S.E.2d at 301.
84. 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).
85. Brandau, 292 Ga. App at 301, 664 S.E.2d at 301.
86. Id. at 301-02, 664 S.E.2d at 301; accord Barnes, 282 Ga. App. at 899, 640 S.E.2d
at 615.
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Freeman was consistently referred to as a county officer."8 7 However,
in Brandau, the court held that Freeman was actually an elected
constitutional county officer rather than an employee." Furthermore,
the court of appeals observed that Freeman could have been considered
an employee under the WCA if the county's governing authority had
passed an appropriate resolution, but Freeman had not tendered such
a resolution into evidence.89
The court of appeals held that Freeman was not a county employee
and, thus, he and Brandau were not co-employees at the time of her
death. ° Consequently, the exclusive remedy provision did not bar the
plaintiff's claims. 91
VI.

FICTIONAL NEW INJURY

In Laurens County Board of Education v. Dewberry,9 the court of
appeals distinguished between a "change in condition for the worse'
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1044 and a "fictional new injury."' The ALJ
found that Walter Dewberry, the claimant, experienced a fictional new
accident and, thus, the Georgia Education Workers' Compensation Trust
Fund (GEWCT) was responsible for Dewberry's claims rather than the
Georgia School Board Association Self-Insurance Fund (GSBA), which
was the board of education's prior insurer.'
Dewberry was a custodian employed by the board of education. On
August 1, 2000, Dewberry tripped over a cord and fell while stripping a
floor, injuring his right knee. He was diagnosed with a medial meniscus
tear and underlying degenerative arthritis in his knee. On September
11, 2001, Dewberry underwent arthroscopic surgery, causing him to miss
work for six weeks. While GSBA paid all of Dewberry's medical bills,
GSBA did not pay Dewberry any income benefits, nor did Dewberry
request such benefits. Upon returning to work, Dewberry's physician
issued a permanent disability rating of nine percent to the lower
extremity or four percent to the whole person on February 2, 2002.

87. Brandau, 292 Ga. App. at 302, 664 S.E.2d at 301.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 303, 664 Ga. App. at 302.
Id.
296 Ga. App. 204, 674 S.E.2d 73 (2009).
Id. at 205, 674 S.E.2d at 75.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104 (2008).
Dewberry, 296 Ga. App. at 205, 674 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 204, 674 S.E.2d at 74.
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GSBA did not pay Dewberry any permanent partial disability income
benefits. 97
Two years later, GEWCT (rather than GSBA) began providing
insurance coverage for the board of education. Dewberry sought
additional medical treatment for his knee, which was still paid for by
GSBA. On July 7, 2005, a doctor recommended knee replacement
surgery and noted that the replacement was related to Dewberry's prior
knee injury at work. Although Dewberry agreed to the surgery, GSBA
canceled the surgery and ceased paying for treatment. Until the
insurance issue was resolved and Dewberry could undergo surgery for
his knee, the doctor placed him on restrictions at work. The board of
education failed to accommodate the restrictions, and Dewberry stopped
working on November 18, 2005. Dewberry subsequently filed a workers'
compensation claim. The ALJ held that Dewberry suffered a fictional
new accident on November 18, 2005, and GEWCT was responsible for
paying claims because it had assumed insurance coverage as of August
1, 2003. 98
GEWCT contended that as a matter of law and fact, Dewberry
experienced a change in condition for the worse under O.C.G.A. § 34-9104 and not a fictional new injury. Thus, the responsibility of paying
the claim should belong to GSBA.9 The court of appeals disagreed and
opined that a change in condition "'can occur only when the claimant
has previously received benefits for a compensable job-related inju10 0
ry.'
Additionally, the court held that if a claimant sustains an injury while
working and continues to work without receiving workers' compensation
benefits but then ceases work due to a gradual worsening condition, the
result is a fictional new accident so long as the worsening condition is
partially attributable to continued work." 1 According to the court 1of
02
appeals, this was precisely what occurred in the instant case.
Moreover, when "an employer changes insurance carriers, the carrier on
the date of a fictional new accident is liable for the claim, even [if] the
condition existed prior to the carrier's coverage." 1" Thus, GEWCT was

97. Id.
98. Id. at 204-05, 674 S.E.2d at 74-75.
99. Id. at 205, 674 S.E.2d at 75.
100. Id. at 206, 674 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Babyak,
186 Ga. App. 339, 341, 367 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1988)).
101. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 75-76.
102. Id. at 207, 674 S.E.2d at 76.
103. Id. at 206, 674 S.E.2d at 75 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 139 Ga. App.
85, 86-87, 227 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1976)).
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liable for Dewberry's claim.'
Dewberry never received workers'
compensation benefits or income benefits for the August 1, 2005 workrelated injury."3°
Consequently, Dewberry could not establish a
change in condition."° The court of appeals held that "[tihe Appellate
Division and the superior court were correct in affirming the AI's
conclusion that GEWCT" was responsible for Dewberry's fictional new
accident claim.. 7
VII. INMATE EMPLOYMENT
In Clarke v. Country Home Bakers," the court of appeals addressed
the issue of whether a prison inmate working for a private employer
through the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) work release
program should be deemed an "employee" under the WCA.' ° The
Board denied Nathan Clarke's claim for temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits, and that decision was later affirmed by the superior court." °
Clarke was serving a six-year prison term for vehicular homicide and
driving under the influence. After serving half of his term, the DOC
permitted Clarke to participate in a work release program as a trustee
working for Country Home Bakers, a private employer. On December
28, 2005, Clarke fell while working at the bakery and sustained a
serious injury. He was hospitalized for two weeks and eventually
returned to the prison until he was paroled in 2006."'
St. Paul Travelers Insurance Company paid Clarke workers' compensation benefits after his accident. When Clarke was released from the
hospital and transferred back to prison, however, the DOC notified the
insurance company that it did not have to continue to provide workers'
compensation benefits. The DOC noted that Clarke was incarcerated
and therefore ineligible to receive benefits. After he was paroled, Clarke
filed a workers' compensation claim seeking TTD benefits, which the
AUJ denied. The decision was affirmed by the appellate division and the
superior court."'
The AL found that Clarke was not an "employee" of the bakery at the
time of his accident. Consequently, the AL held that Clarke was not

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 208, 674 S.E.2d at 76-77.
Id., 674 S.E.2d at 76.
Id.
Id., 674 S.E.2d at 76-77.
294 Ga. App. 302, 669 S.E.2d 177 (2008).
Id. at 302, 669 S.E.2d at 178.
Id.
Id. at 303, 669 S.E.2d at 178.
Id. at 303-04, 669 S.E.2d at 178.
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entitled to workers' compensation benefits."'

Under O.C.G.A § 34-9-

1(2),114

[ilnmates or persons participating in a work release program,
community service program, or similar program as part of the punishment for violation of a ...state law shall not be deemed to be an

employee while participating in work or training or while going to and
from the work site or training site."'
Clarke did not dispute the fact that he was an inmate at the time of the
accident. However, he argued that he was not subject to the exclusion
contained in O.C.G.A § 34-9-1(2) because his participation in the work
release program was voluntary and was not part of his punishment." 6
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court."7 In
the eyes of the appellate court, Clarke chose to participate in the work
release program as part of his punishment." 8 Clarke was given
19
limited choices regarding how he spent his time while incarcerated."
Although Clarke chose to participate in the work release program, he
was subject to drug screens and a curfew, his transportation to and from
work was restricted, and he was required to eat all meals besides lunch
at the correctional facility. 2 ° The court held that Clarke was still
legally confined within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-59 21 even
though he was physically at the bakery.12 Furthermore, the DOC
could have reduced or eliminated Clarke's hours and salary as well as
precluded him from participating in the work release program.'" The
DOC had control over Clarke and, thus, the court of appeals held that
his participation in the work release program was part of his punishment." 4 Therefore, he was not an employee under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 304, 669 S.E.2d at 179.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2) (2008).
Id.
Clarke, 294 Ga. App. at 304, 669 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 305, 669 S.E.2d at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303, 669 S.E.2d at 178.
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-59 (1997).
Clarke, 294 Ga. App. at 304, 669 S.E.2d at 179.
Id.
Id.
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1(2), and his claim for workers' compensation benefits was properly
denied.1"
VIII.

PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM UNEXPLAINED DEATH

In Keystone Automotive v. Hall,1"A the court of appeals applied the
"Zamorapresumption" that a worker's injuries arise out of employment
when the precipitating cause of death is unexplained.1" In Keystone
Automotive, the claimant, a route salesman, was found unconscious next
to his truck on Keystone's premises. He was taken to the hospital where
he died approximately three weeks later."2 Several physicians agreed
that the immediate cause of death stemmed from some natural condition
such as heart dysrhythmia. However, neither party was able to pinpoint
the precipitating cause of the claimant's death- that is, what caused
him to collapse initially."2
Typically, "[tihe burden of proof. . . is upon the claimant to show that
the employee suffered an accidental injury which arose out of and in the
course of his employment." 3 ' However, "when an employee is found
dead in a place where he might reasonably have been expected to be in
the performance of his duties, it is presumed that the death arose out of
his employment." 3 ' This does not mean that the immediate cause of
death must be explained, but rather, the precipitating cause must be
explained. 32 These same rules apply when "the immediate cause of
death arises from internal and physical rather than external and nonphysical factors.""3 When the precipitating causative factor of an
internal physical injury is unexplained, the plaintiff is aided in
demonstrating his or her burden with the presumption that the injury
arose out of employment."

125. Id. at 305, 669 S.E.2d at 179.
126. 292 Ga. App. 645, 665 S.E.2d 392 (2008).
127. See id at 651-52, 665 S.E.2d at 397 (citing Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga.
App. 82, 83-85, 290 S.E.2d 192, 193-94 (1982)).
128. Id. at 645-46, 665 S.E.2d at 393.
129. Id. at 649-51, 665 S.E.2d at 395-96.
130. Id. at 651, 665 S.E.2d at 396 (quoting Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 83-84, 290 S.E.2d
at 193).
131. Id. (quoting Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 84, 290 S.E.2d at 193).
132. Id. at 652, 665 S.E.2d at 397 (citing Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91,
94, 444 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1994)).
133. Id. at 651, 665 S.E.2d at 396 (quoting Zamora, 162 Ga. App. at 85, 290 S.E.2d at
195).
134. Id. at 653, 665 S.E.2d at 397-98 (citing Buschel, 213 Ga. App. at 94, 444 S.E.2d
at 108).
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In Keystone Automotive, the employer argued that because there was
no evidence pointing to some significant external event that triggered
the employee's death, it was logical to conclude that both the immediate
and precipitating causes of death were the same. 35 However, the
"presumption arises when the employee's death is unexplained. This
does not mean, however, that the immediate cause of death must be
explained; it means that the precipitating cause, rather than the
immediate cause, of death must be unexplained. 1 " An independent
medical review revealed that "something caused Mr. Hall to collapse,"
but the exact cause was not clear."', This statement supports the
court's decision that the injury was unexplained.'
A blanket statement that the injury was not caused by the employment did nothing to
explain the precipitating factor.'39
As a result, the claimant was afforded the benefit of the Zamora
presumption. 14° In turn, the burden shifted to Keystone to present any
evidence related to the precipitating cause to revoke the claimant's
Zamora presumption."" As the independent medical review only
revealed that "something" caused the employee's collapse, this burden
was not met, and the trial court did not err in reversing the appellate
142
division's ruling.

135. Id. at 652, 665 S.E.2d at 397.
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Buschel, 213 Ga. App. at 94, 444
S.E.2d at 108).
137. Id. at 649,665 S.E.2d at 395 (emphasis omitted). The independent medical review
stated: "Obviously, something caused Mr. Hall to collapse on August 6th. While it is not
crystal clear exactly what that event was, none of the plausible causes of his collapse have
any relationship whatsoever to Mr. Hall's employment." Id. (emphasis omitted).
138. See id. at 652-53, 665 S.E.2d at 397.
139. See id. The court noted that this opinion was outside the domain of the
physician's expertise. Id. at 652, 665 S.E.2d at 397. Peculiarly, the physician could not
determine what the precipitating factor was but could somehow opine that it was
unequivocally not caused by any work-related activities. Id.; see also Johnson v. Knebel,
267 Ga. 853, 855-58, 485 S.E.2d 451, 453-55 (1997) (discussing the scope of testimony and
opinions for expert witnesses).
140. Keystone Automotive, 292 Ga. App. at 653, 665 S.E.2d at 397.
141. See id. at 653-54, 665 S.E.2d at 397-98.
142. Id. at 654, 665 S.E.2d at 398. In addition to the argument discussed at length,
Keystone also contended that under O.C.GA. § 34-9-1(4) (2008) the medical evidence made
this a "heart case." Keystone Automotive, 292 Ga. App. at 654, 665 S.E.2d at 398.
Keystone argued that, because this was a heart case, the claimant was required to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions were attributable to the
performance of the ususal work of employment before they could be considered an injury.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A § 34-9-1(4)). This argument was thrown out because medical evidence
demonstrated that the employee did not die as a result of any of the heart conditions set
forth in the statute. Id.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY

In Dekalb County Board of Education v. Singleton,43 the court of
appeals examined a decision awarding benefits to an employee on the
ground that, under Southwire Co. v. George,'" she suffered a compensable psychological injury.145 The claimant, a bus driver, noticed white
powder covering the bus's interior. She believed the powder was fire
extinguisher residue and mold, and she attempted to clean the bus using
cleaning products provided by the school board. After driving for
approximately forty-five minutes, she began coughing and fell ill, and
she was later diagnosed as having suffered an asthma attack. She was
given breathing treatment and medication and was released to return to
work with no restrictions the next day.14 Although she was willing
to return to work, the claimant preferred to work indoors due to her
concern for the children's safety as well as for her own health. She was
not offered another job, and she did not return to work. She was
terminated for job abandonment,
and the ALJ awarded income benefits
147
and medical treatment.

The Georgia Supreme Court in Southwire held that a psychological
injury is compensable only "if it arises 'naturally and unavoidably ...
from some discernible physical occurrence. '" ' 48 Additionally, a claimant is entitled to benefits for psychological treatment that, even if not
"precipitated by a physical injury, arose out of an accident in which a
compensable physical injury was sustained, and that injury contributes
to the continuation of the psychic trauma." 49 Thus, two conditions
precedent are required for a psychological injury to be compensable. 50
First, the psychological injury "must arise out of an accident in which a
compensable physical injury was sustained." 5 ' Second, the physical
injury, even if not the precipitating cause of the psychological condition,
"must contribute to the continuation of the psychological trauma."'52

143. 294 Ga. App. 96, 668 S.E.2d 767 (2008).
144. 266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996).
145. See Singleton, 294 Ga. App. at 99-101, 668 S.E.2d at 769-70.
146. Id. at 97, 668 S.E.2d at 768.
147. Id. at 99, 668 S.E.2d at 769.
148. 266 Ga. at 741,470 SE.2d at 866 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Hanson Buick Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 131, 295 S.E.2d 846,
847 (1982)).
149. Id.
150. Singleton, 294 Ga. App. at 100, 668 S.E.2d at 770.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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In Singleton the employer and its insurer argued that the claimant
suffered from mild depression and anxiety, which are not compensable
psychological injuries.'
But the ALJ found, and the court of appeals
agreed, that the evidence indicated the psychological problems were
more than mild and in fact stemmed from a real fear of death from
potential asthma attacks and concern for the children riding the bus she
would drive."' Thus, the judgment awarding workers' compensation
benefits to the claimant was affirmed.'5 5
X.

REVIVAL OF DORMANT BENEFITS

Under Georgia law, a judgment becomes dormant seven years after the
execution date of the judgment.'
A dormant judgment may be
revived if a motion to revive is filed before ten years have elapsed from
the date the judgment was executed.' 57 In Taylor v. PeachbeltProperties, Inc.,"S the Board found that Taylor was totally disabled by a
workplace injury and awarded her a lump sum of $37,747.08 for medical
expenses and travel reimbursement. The Board further ordered that her
uninsured employer, Peachbelt, pay a weekly disability benefit of
$127.90. Judgment was entered on April 3, 1995, but Taylor never
received the lump sum or weekly payments.' 59
On February 23, 2005, Taylor filed a complaint to revive the lump sum
amount, plus interest, which had become dormant. On January 27,
2006, the court granted Taylor's request for revival and on April 6, 2006,
entered a writ of fieri facias-a writ of execution-pertaining to the
lump sum and interest. On July 27, 2007, Taylor moved the court to do
two things: (1) amend the 2006 judgment and (2) issue a new writ of
execution regarding her unattained weekly payments." 6
A judge may amend a judgment for any number of reasons; however,
this authority does not extend beyond the same term of court unless a
motion regarding the judgment is filed within the same term.'' The
term for the Houston County Superior Court ended on April 2, 2006.162

153. Id.
154. Id. at 99-101, 668 S.E.2d at 769-70.
155. Id. at 100-01, 668 S.E.2d at 770.
156. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(a) (2006).
157. Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 163, 205 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1974); see also O.C.G.A.
§ 9-12-61 (2006).
158. 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008).
159. Id. at 336, 667 S.E.2d at 119.
160. Id. at 336-37, 667 S.E.2d at 119-20.
161. Id. at 337, 667 S.E.2d at 120 (citing Tanaka v. Pecqueur, 268 Ga. App. 380,
381-82, 601 S.E.2d 830, 832 (2004)).
162. Id.

416

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Because Taylor moved to amend the judgment well outside of the court
term, her motion was denied by the superior court, and the court of
appeals affirmed."6'
A judgment may be amended out of term under limited circumstances--for example, to present a court with a certified copy of a Board
decision that alters a weekly payment or to make a judgment conform
to the truth.' As Taylor did not present such a Board decision to the
court, the first exception did not apply.'
Similarly, as Taylor limited
her initial request, the narrow judgment, which only addressed the
request, was not untruthful.'
Consequently, the court of appeals
affirmed the superior court's refusal to modify the 2006 judgment.'6 7
Insightfully, the court of appeals held that the superior court should
have entered Taylor's writ of execution as to all weekly payments that
were not dormant."
Installment payments that have come due
within seven years preceding the date of execution are enforceable and
collectible, regardless of when the installment plan was awarded. 169
Taylor filed her motion on July 27, 2007, and thus, any payments owed
to her between July 27, 2000, and the date of the motion were not yet
dormant. 70 Because these payments were not dormant, the court was
obliged 17to1 issue a writ of execution in the aggregate past-due
amount.

XI. STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
of appeals in Creeden v. Fuentes12 addressed

The court
a frequently
occurring scenario. Highland Custom Homes initially purchased several
tracts of land and in turn contracted with individuals for the purchase
and sale of houses and the subsequent transfer of the properties when
the houses were substantially completed. The specific agreement for
purchase, sale, and transfer of the property gave the purchaser control

163. Id. at 338, 340, 667 S.E.2d at 120, 122.

164. Id. at 338, 667 S.E.2d at 120 (citing O.C.GA. § 9-12-14 (2006); O.C.GA. § 15-1-3(6)
(2008); O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 (2008)); see also Floyd v. Springfield Plantation Prop. Owners'
Ass'n, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 535, 536-37, 538 S.E.2d 455, 457 (2000); Brown v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 490, 490, 148 S.E.2d 436, 436 (1966).
165. Taylor, 293 Ga. App. at 338, 667 S.E.2d at 120.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 122.
168. Id. at 341, 667 S.E.2d at 122.
169. Id. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 121.
170. Id. at 340-41, 667 S.E.2d at 121-22.
171. Id. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 122 (citing Ayers v. Rembert, 241 Ga. App. 698, 699,527
S.E.2d 290, 292 (1999)).
172. 296 Ga. App. 96, 673 S.E.2d 611 (2009).
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over the design of the house, even though Highland still owned the
property. Pursuant to their contract to build the house, Highland hired
Rich Drywall, Inc., who in turn hired another subcontractor, who in turn
hired Fuentes as part of the drywall sanding crew. Fuentes was injured
when he fell down an elevator shaft on a construction site where he was
73
employed.1

Following the injury, Fuentes received compensation benefits from
Rich Drywall, but he subsequently sued Highland and Highland's owner,
alleging that their negligence contributed to his injury.1 7 The trial
court found that Highland was an owner who was in possession of the
premises, 17 5 and thus, Highland was not a statutory employer under
O.C.G.A § 34-9-8.17' Furthermore, the trial court declined to dismiss
the claim based
upon Highland's request to apply the exclusive remedy
177
doctrine.

The court of appeals disagreed with Fuentes and reversed.178 The
court of appeals acknowledged the ruling in Yoho v. Ringier of America,
Inc.1 79 that "an owner who is merely in possession or control of the
premises is not subject to workers' compensation liability as a statutory
employer and is not immune from tort liability." 8° However, the court
of appeals also relied upon the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
Manning v. Georgia Power Co.,'"' which held that an owner serving as
a contractor for another party is a statutory employer in the subcontractor context.'8 2 The court noted that "an 'owner' can attain 'contractor'
status under [O.C.G.A.] § 34-9-8(a) 'in the isolated situation where [the

173. Id. at 96-97, 673 S.E.2d at 612.
174. Id. at 97, 673 S.E.2d at 612.
175. Id.
176. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (2008); Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 97, 673 S.E.2d at 612.
177. Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 97, 673 S.E.2d at 612.
178. Id. at 96, 673 S.E.2d at 611.
179. 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
180. Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 99, 673 S.E.2d at 613 (citing Yoho, 263 Ga. at 341, 434
S.E.2d at 59).
181. 252 Ga. 404, 314 S.E.2d 432 (1984).
182. Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 98, 673 S.E.2d at 613 (citing Manning, 252 Ga. at 406,
314 S.E.2d at 434). In Manning the court held as follows:
"Owners or entities merely in possession or control of the premises would not be
subject to workers' compensation liability as statutory employers, except in the
isolated situation where the party also serves as a contractor for yet another
entity and hires another contractor to perform the work on the premises."
252 Ga. at 406, 314 S.E.2d at 434 (misquoted in original) (quoting Modlin v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477, 478-79, 317 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1984)).
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party] also serves as a contractor for yet another entity and hires
another contractor to perform the work on the premises. ' " '
In Creeden Highland fit squarely under the owner-contractor
exception discussed in both Evans v. Hawkinsl" and Manning, and
thus, Highland was afforded treatment as a statutory employer.18
"[Alithough Highland retained ownership of the property, it was working
at the behest of DeGaule, who had specifically contracted with Highland
to build his home according to his specifications."'" Unlike a mere
owner of property, Highland "'had certain continuing obligations to
[DeGaule] with regard to the [property] that it owned.'"'1 7 Accordingly, as a statutory employer, Highland was exempt from tort liability for
Fuentes's injuries under the exclusive remedy doctrine."
XII.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In McLendon v. Advertising That Works,' 89 the court of appeals dealt
with the one-year statute of limitations governing the filing of a claim.
The claimant filed a WC-14 form on March 14, 2005, listing July 16,
2004, as the date of the accident (first claim). He later filed another
WC-14 on July 12, 2005, amending the date of the accident to June 8,
2004 (second claim). Both the first and second claims contained similar
descriptions of the accident and the injuries sustained. He later
submitted a third WC-14 that alleged a January 14, 2004 date of
accident (third claim).

90

The ALJ dismissed the first and third claims with prejudice, and the
employer moved to bar the second claim under a one-year statute of
limitations because the claim arising out of the accident on June 8, 2004,
was not asserted until July 12, 2005. The claimant argued that the
statute of limitations did not apply because the second claim served as
an amendment to the first claim. 191 He asserted that under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-15(c), 192 claims arising from the same conduct should relate
back to the initial filing. Therefore, the claimant argued that his first

183. Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 99, 673 S.E.2d at 613 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Yoho,
263 Ga. at 340, 434 S.E.2d at 59).
184. 114 Ga. App. 120, 150 S.E.2d 324 (1966).
185. Creeden, 296 Ga. App. at 100, 673 S.E.2d at 614.
186. Id.
187. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Richets v. Tri-State Sys. Inc., 177 Ga. App.
509, 510, 339 S.E.2d 732, 733 (1986)).
188. Id.
189. 292 Ga. App. 677, 665 S.E.2d 370 (2008).
190. Id. at 678, 665 S.E.2d at 371.
191. Id. at 678-79, 665 S.E.2d at 371-72.
192. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (2006).
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claim on March 14, 2005, which listed a July 16, 2004 accident date, did
not violate the statute of limitations. The AJ disagreed and held that
the statute of limitations applied because the second claim was
completely independent from the first claim.'9 3
On appeal, the claimant argued that he did not recall the specific date
of the accident at the time he filed the first claim, so when the medical
records indicated a more accurate June 8, 2004 accident date, he filed a
WC-14 with the correct accident date. He argued that his initial
mistake about the date of the accident should not be fatal to his claim,
and he attached supporting medical records and hearing transcripts as
exhibits to his application for discretionary appeal to demonstrate his
mistake and that the claims arose from the same injury."M The court,
however, determined that the claimant failed to show support of his
arguments because he did not attach his supporting documents as part
of the appellate record.'9 5
The court also determined that because he claimed temporary total
disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits in his first
claim, but only claimed permanent partial disability benefits in his
second claim, the two claims were in fact different. 9 ' Moreover, he
had filed another claim in November 2005 that claimed an injury using
the same descriptions as the first and second claims. 9 7 Because the
claimant asserted he was injured on multiple dates, there was at least
some evidence to support that the second claim
was independent of the
198
first claim, and therefore was time-barred.
The claimant also argued that the AL erred in ruling that O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-15(c) did not apply.'99 The court of appeals, however, determined that the claimant failed to show an error because he did not
demonstrate that this section of the Civil Practice Act (CPA) 2°° had
been incorporated into the WCA.2° ' Furthermore, the ALJ considered
whether O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) applied and concluded that it did not.20 2
In the concurrence, Presiding Judge J.D. Smith opined that O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-102(d)(1) 211 incorporated CPA discovery provisions into the

193.
194.
195.

McLendon, 292 Ga. App. at 678-79, 665 S.E.2d at 371-72.
Id., 665 S.E.2d at 372.
Id. at 679, 665 S.E.2d at 372.

196. Id. at 679-80, 665 S.E.2d at 372-73.
197. Id. at 680, 665 S.E.2d at 372.
198. Id., 665 S.E.2d at 372-73.
199. Id., 665 S.E.2d at 373.
200. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -85 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
201. McLendon, 292 Ga. App. at 680, 665 S.E.2d at 373.
202. Id.

203. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(dXl) (2008).
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WCA, and therefore O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) did not apply.2c 4 Although
the court has held that provisions of the CPA "may apply even in the
absence of a statutory mandate when 'common sense and equity require'" its application, such was not the case with the present
claims.'
XIII.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHANGE IN CONDITION AND
CATASTROPHIC DESIGNATION

Several decisions were handed down in the past year that dealt with
interpreting and applying the statute of limitations to change-incondition requests, including requesting catastrophic designation.
In United Grocery Outlet v. Bennett,2 °0 the claimant requested
reinstatement of TTD benefits based on a change in her condition. The
claimant, who worked as an assistant manager for United Grocery, was
injured when she fell and broke her arm on August 11, 2001. She
received TTD payments for time lost from work, and the final payment
came in November 2001. The claimant requested a hearing on October
12, 2004, during which she sought to resume TTD payments by asserting
that she suffered a change in condition when United Grocery terminated
her employment in December 2003.20?
The court's analysis of this claim was governed by the plain language
of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b), "°s which reads in pertinent part:
for another decision [regarding TT
benefits] because of a change in condition ending, decreasing, increas[Any party may apply ...

ing, or authorizing the recovery of income benefits ... provided ...

that at the time of application not more than two years have elapsed
since the date the last payment of [ l1TDI income benefits ... was
actually made.'
The claimant contended that because United Grocery did not serve her
with the appropriate forms indicating the termination of benefits, she
never received notice that her TTD benefits had ended or were suspended.210 Consequently, she argued "that she was denied due process and

204. See McLendon, 292 Ga. App. at 681-82, 665 S.E.2d at 373-74 (Smith, P.J.,
concurring specially).
205. Id., 665 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Wade v. Harris, 210 Ga. App. 882,884,437 S.E.2d

863, 866 (1993)).
206. 292 Ga. App. 363, 665 S.E.2d 27 (2008).
207. Id. at 363, 665 S.E.2d at 28.

208. O.C.GA. § 34-9-104(b) (2008).
209. Id., quoted in United Grocery, 292 Ga. App. at 364, 665 S.E.2d at 28 (emphasis
omitted).

210. United Grocery, 292 Ga. App. at 364-65, 665 S.E.2d at 29.
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should not be subject to the two-year limitation period."2 11 The court
disagreed and opined that the issue was "whether [the claimant] timely
brought her claim for additional benefits based on a change in condition,
not whether United Grocery properly notified her in November 2001 that
her benefits had been terminated. 2
The court distinguished the holding in Russell Morgan Landscape
Management v. Velez-Ochoa" 3 from the instant case.21 4 In Russell
the "claimant challenged the actual suspension of benefits, and proper
notice of that suspension was key to the opinion."2 1 '

There, "the

employer's failure to complete the benefits-suspension form deprived the
employee of 'fair notice' regarding the actual grounds for the suspension."1 6 In United Grocery, however, the court ruled that there had
been no due process violation because the claimant had "actual
knowledge of the date of
the last payment-the triggering mechanism for
217
the limitation period."

The court further noted:
Nothing in the statutory language tolls this period pending compliance
with rules regarding the filing and service of board forms. Although
an employer who violates these rules may be-and in this case
was--subject to civil penalties, we find no grounds for delaying or
extending the statute of limitation based on such noncompliance.218
Consequently, in a request to reinstate TTD benefits pursuant to a
change in condition, an employer's failure to notify a claimant that
payments have ended does not toll the statutory two-year period for
reinstating benefits.2 1 9
In Williams v. Conagra Poultry of Athens, Inc.,2 ° the court of
appeals again interpreted O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) and the law governing
requests for a change in condition.22' In Williams the claimant injured
her neck and shoulders while working at the Conagra chicken plant. As
a result of her injuries, she received TTD benefits for the maximum
allowable period of 400 weeks, which ended in April 2001. The claimant
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filed two requests that her injury be designated as "catastrophic" in
March 2002 and April 2003, both of which the Board denied. In
September 2003, the claimant submitted a third request, this time
including additional information about work restrictions.222
After Conagra agreed to accept the claimant's request of catastrophic
injury for medical benefits only, the parties submitted the issue of
additional income benefits to an ALT. The ALJ ruled that the claimant
was not entitled to the additional catastrophic injury benefits, specifically TTD benefits, because the two-year statute of limitations for TTD
benefits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) had expired.223 The
superior court agreed,22 and the court of appeals affirmed.225
226
The court in Williams cited Cobb County School District v. Barker
for the proposition that the designation of catastrophic injury is a
status. 2 7 Under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b), a request to reinstate or
change benefits due to a change in condition must be made within two
years of the date of the last payment of TTD income benefits.2 2
Because a claimant's request for catastrophic designation is a change in
status, the request for increased income benefits is plainly subject to the
statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b). 229 In Williams the third request for income benefits based on catastrophic status
was not made in compliance with the time parameters established by
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) and was thus barred.23 °
Tara Foods v. Johnson231 similarly involved the application of the
change-in-condition statute of limitations to a request for catastrophic
designation. The claimant sustained a compensable work injury to her
neck on November 31, 1992, and received benefits until August 28, 2001.
In November 2002 the claimant filed a WC-14 notice of claim, indicating
she was not requesting a hearing.232 However, she "checked the box
next to 'income benefits' and wrote 'TTD from 8-28-01 for catastrophic
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designation.'"' 3 She filed another WC-14 on August 22, 2005, and
requested a hearing without raising the issue of catastrophic designation. She filed a third WC-14 on September 15, 2006, requesting a
hearing and a catastrophic designation.2"
The ALJ and appellate division determined that the statute of
limitations had expired on the claimant's request for catastrophic
designation because more than two years had elapsed between the final
payment of income benefits to the claimant and her filing of the third
WC-14, which was her first hearing request for catastrophic designation.
The claimant attempted to avoid the statute of limitations by arguing
that the initial WC-14 she fied constituted an application for a change
of condition within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b).28 The court
of appeals held that the claimant failed to meet the requirements on her
request for catastrophic injury status because the first WC-14 was only
designated as a notice of claim.' 8 It was not until more than five
years after receiving her last income benefit payment that the claimant
raised the catastrophic designation issue in a hearing request, which
was ultimately too late.2 7 The claim was thus time-barred.238
XlV.

SUBROGATION:

CONFLICTS OF LAw

The court of appeals in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roark 9
addressed the issue of conflict of laws in an insurance company's claim
for subrogation under the WCA." 0 Robert Roark, a Tennessee citizen
and resident, was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by David
McReynolds, who was driving a vehicle owned by Russell McReynolds.
The accident occurred during the course of Roark's employment for a
Tennessee corporation, Short Mountain Trucking, Inc., but it occurred
in Catoosa County, Georgia. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company paid
Roark Tennessee workers' compensation benefits. The claim was
eventually settled, and Roark received total workers' compensation
benefits of $79,007.85 from Liberty Mutual."
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Later, Roark and his wife brought suit against McReynolds for loss of
consortium and personal injuries. 2 Liberty Mutual then filed an
intervenor complaint to protect its subrogation lien created by O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-11.1(b). 243 The Roarks and the McReynolds were able to resolve
the matter and settle the case for $80,000. The settlement was
conditioned upon the resolution of Liberty Mutual's subrogation lien,
which was impeded by the inability of the Roarks and Liberty Mutual
to agree on whether the laws of Georgia or Tennessee governed
subrogation rights."
The court of appeals held that Georgia's WCA applies
when the injury occurred in Georgia, and the plaintiff was eligible to
receive workers' compensation benefits in Georgia, even though the
employment relationship may have been localized in another state and
the plaintiff
may have been eligible for such benefits in another
2
state. 4

Where a nonresident employee, hired by a foreign corporation, is
injured in Georgia, arising out of and in the scope of the employment,
Georgia will apply its own substantive law, whether or not the Georgia
Workers' Compensation law was invoked to pay, because the Georgia
conflicts of law rules look to the state of the last act completing the tort
to determine the applicable substantive law. 2'
Thus, the court of appeals held that Georgia law, rather than
Tennessee law, would govern Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim
because Roark was injured in Georgia and was entitled to workers'
compensation benefits in Georgia. 247 Liberty Mutual contended that
workers' compensation subrogation is a contract at law and, thus, the
doctrine of lex loci contractus should be applied to its subrogation
claim.' " Liberty Mutual also argued that the Roarks consented to
"Tennessee law when they moved to join Liberty Mutual as an indispensable party, and that the trial court authorized Liberty Mutual's
claim under Tennessee law when it granted the Roarks' joinder
request."249 However, the court of appeals held that Georgia courts
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have addressed the particular issue of subrogation rights presented in
this case and have determined that Georgia law applies.' According
to the court of appeals, the Roarks never consented to Tennessee law,
and nothing in the record supported the idea that the trial court
authorized Tennessee law." 1 Consequently, the court of appeals
affirmed the superior court's granting of the Roarks' motion for judgment
on the pleadings and denial of Liberty Mutuals motion for summary
judgment. 2
XV. SUPERADDED INJURIES; SErrING ASIDE BOARD DECISIONS
In City of Atlanta v. Roach,' the employee suffered third-degree
burns to his hip when he fell asleep on a heating pad. Roach, a police
officer, originally injured his hip in 2004 when his squad car was hit by
a drunk driver. Roach argued that the burns on his hip constituted a
compensable "superadded injury." An ALJ agreed, but the Appellate
Division disagreed, noting that the injury did not result from reasonably
required or authorized medical treatment.2
Section 34-9-105(c) of the O.C.G.A. 25 permits a superior court to set
aside a Board decision when there is either insufficient evidence to
warrant the decision or when the decision is contrary to law.' Roach
appealed from the decision of the Appellate Division, 7 and the
superior court held that the Board's decision was both contrary to law
and unsupported by sufficient evidence."8 The superior court reasoned
that Georgia law did not require a "direct causal relationship" between
the two injuries and that the medical treatment need not be specifically
prescribed or authorized, but simply related to the injury.2 9 The court
of appeals disagreed and reversed.2"
Traditionally, a superadded injury stems from physical injuries and
generally arises as a natural consequence of the original event, not a
new event or accident.261 In Roach the Board found that the burn
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injury "did not arise as a 'natural consequence of' or arise 'directly from'
the fractured hip."262 As this finding was supported by some evidence,
the court of appeals determined it should not have been reversed.2"
The court of appeals also reversed the superior court's conclusion of
law that medical treatment need not be specifically authorized to result
in a superadded injury stemming from treatment.2 ' In Standridge v.
Candlewick Yarns,2" the court of appeals noted that an injury "resulting from medical treatment undertaken to cure [a] work-related injury"
is a superadded injury.2 m However, such treatment must be both (1)
authorized or prescribed by a physician and (2) reasonably required.26 7
In Roach the treating physician never prescribed the use of a heating
pad, 26 "and it was within the Board's power as a factfinding body to
determine that prolonged use of the device while sleeping was not
reasonable and necessary medical treatment."26 9 Consequently, the
court of appeals held that the superior court erred in setting aside the
Board's 0decision that Roach's burns were not a compensable superadded
27
injury.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
429.
267.
268.
269.
270.

297 Ga. App. at 411, 677 S.E.2d at 429.
Id.
Id. at 411-13, 677 S.E.2d at 429-30.
202 Ga. App. 553, 415 S.E.2d 10 (1992).
Id. at 555, 415 S.E.2d at 12, quoted in Roach, 297 Ga. App. at 411, 677 S.E.2d at
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) (2008).
Roach, 297 Ga. App. at 412, 677 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 412-13, 677 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 413, 677 S.E.2d at 430.

